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What are the effects of institutional subversion on small business development, fiscal policies, 
economic growth, and firm performance? This paper provides an empirical investigation of 
institutional subversion in Russia’s regions. We develop a complete account of preferential treatments 
to the largest regional firms in texts of regional legislation during 1992-2000 and use the concentration 
of preferential treatments as a proxy for legislative subversion. Based on cross-section and panel data 
analysis, we find that regional institutional subversion has an adverse effect on small business growth, 
tax collection, social public spending, and federal tax arrears. At the firm-level, substantial gains are 
generated to firms that exercise political influence on regional authorities both in the long and the short 
run. These firms exhibit faster growth in sales, market share, employment, and investment in the short 
run compared to their counterparts who are not politically connected. In the long run, firms that 
exercise political influence have higher market share growth despite lower labor productivity. We 
check the robustness of these results by looking at an alternative proxy for potential subversion based 
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“…oligarchy […] throws a close network of dependence 
relationships over all the economic and political institutions  
of present-day bourgeois society without exception…” 
Vladimir Lenin  




Ever since the emergence of post-Washington consensus, striking differences in economic 
performance among transition countries and provinces within transition countries have been attributed 
to differences in institutional environment. A wide range of institutions has been named to be important 
for transition to go smoothly, including: federalism, political regime, property-rights protection, 
presence of an outside anchor, social norms, and trust.1  Institutions, however, are not exogenous. 
Vested interests often influence the evolution of the very rules of the game in the economy. The 
literature labels this phenomenon state capture or institutional subversion.  
The first decade of Russia’s transition was notorious for intervention of oligarchs in 
determining the direction and speed of institutional reforms.2  The BEEPS 1999 survey confirmed that 
state capture was deeply rooted in economic and political processes of the country as Russia ranked the 
fourth in the composite index of state capture among twenty transition countries.3  Russia provides a 
good case for studying consequences of institutional subversion not only because the problem is there, 
but also because of high variation in regional institutions that was a result of vast political autonomy of 
regions in the first half of the 1990s. In addition, all regional laws are in the public domain which 
allowed us to construct a reliable measure of institutional subversion by counting preferential 
treatments to particular firms in regional legislations. This paper attempts a close examination of the  
effect of subversion of regional legislature on regional budgetary and regulatory policies, aggregate 
growth, growth of small businesses, and performance of captor firms. 
The theoretical literature on institutional subversion was originated by Olson (1965), Stigler 
(1971), Pelzman (1976), and Becker (1983) and developed further by Laffont and Tirole (1991). 
Seminal work of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995) created the contemporary framework for 
studying the interest groups politics. Persson (1998) studied interest-group-specific government 
spending. Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2003) analyzed the effects of institutional subversion on 
                                                 
1 For an excellent survey of the literature, see Roland (2000). 
2 Russian oligarchs were called so for a reason. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, “oligarchy is especially despotic 
power exercised by a small and privileged group for corrupt or selfish purposes.” 
3 BEEPS 1999 and 2002 are Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys, conducted jointly by the World 
Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in transition countries. See 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps/ for survey description, data and research. 
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law and order, property rights protection, capital accumulation, growth, and inequality. Benedssen 
(2000) and Sonin (2003a) applied ideas of the literature to the context of transition. Theoretical 
literature identified the following determinants of state capture: cohesiveness of interest groups, level 
of voter awareness, electoral competition, electoral uncertainty (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999), 
political centralization (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000), and initial inequality (Glaeser, Scheinkman, and 
Shleifer, 2003). 
Empirical studies of institutional subversion are scarce. The main reason is the difficulty in 
finding direct measures of influence since neither firms, nor bureaucrats would like to be caught 
engaged in high-level corruption. To the best of our knowledge, all empirical research on state capture 
in transition countries is based on the data from BEEPS 1999 and BEEPS 2002 enterprise surveys that 
asked firms if they engage in activities that can be characterized as extending political influence or feel 
that other firms do that (see, Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, and Schankerman, 2000; Hellman and 
Schankerman, 2000; Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2000; Hellman and Kaufmann, 2003). These 
works show that, first, there is a sizable variation in the levels of capture among transition countries 
and, second, the speed and success of reforms is partly explained by the interplay of capture and 
democratization of transition economies. Firm-level analysis of BEEPS data showed that in high-
capture countries, captor firms showed superior performance in the short run compared to similar non-
captor firms but did not expect to perform better in the long run. Survey evidence produced by BEEPS 
is insightful but has limitations common to cross-country and survey data studies: few observations, 
incomparability of many policy variables, possible discrepancy between perceptions and reality. 
This paper takes another approach – panel-data analysis of regional variation in one country 
based on objective data. It turns out that measuring the extent of institutional subversion based on 
official publicly-available information is challenging but feasible exercise. Russia, as many other 
countries, has a system that allows legislation to be enacted only after its publication. We study 
regional legislation in order to discover laws that treat economic agents unequally. It is worth 
mentioning that in some transition countries (e.g., Uzbekistan) this kind of legislation is a state secret. 
We construct a measure of institutional subversion based on direct evidence of vested interests 
influence in regional legislation. To construct this measure, we, first, count the number of regional 
legislative acts that contain preferential treatments (tax breaks, investment credits, etc.) to several 
largest regional firms in each of 73 regions between 1992 and 2000. A typical example of legislation 
that contains preferential treatment is the following: In 1998, Volgograd regional Duma adopted the 
law “On Special Economic Zone on the Territory of Volgograd Tractor Plant (VTP)”. The law relieves 
all firms from paying regional and local taxes for the period of ten years if these firms operate on the 
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territory of VTP and at least 30% of their assets are in VTP’s ownership. Then, we take concentration 
of the resulting number of preferential treatments among firms as a measure of regional state capture 
controlling for the total number of preferential treatments. Thus, for two regions with the same number 
of legislative acts that contain preferential treatments, the region where preferential treatments go to 
only one (or few) large firms is considered to be more captured compared to the region where 
preferential treatments are uniformly dispersed across firms. In addition, we take the share of 
preferential treatments of a particular firm among the five largest recipients of preferential treatments 
as a proxy for the likelihood that this firm is a captor. 
Albeit these measures account for the very essence of capture, i.e., unequal treatment of firms 
by the legislation, they have serious drawbacks: First, we cannot compare the importance of different 
preferential treatments, thus, we just count the number of “subverted” legislative acts.4 Second, we can 
discover legislative preferential treatment given to a particular firm only when the text of the law 
directly refers this firm.5 Despite all the imperfections of our concentration of preferential treatments 
measure of institutional subversion highly correlates with other measures of institutional subversion 
available for selected years and regions. Preferential treatment concentration has correlation coefficient 
of about 0.45 (significant at 1% significance level) with the Transparency International and INDEM 
state capture rating.6 Our measure of institutional subversion also negatively correlates the Institute of 
Free Media regional index of freedom of press (correlation coefficient is -0.41, significant at 1% 
significance level).7 Another piece of evidence that speaks in favor of our measure is that a robustness 
check that considers size concentration among the biggest regional enterprises as an alternative 
measure of potential institutional subversion produces similar results despite the relatively low 
correlation between the measures of potential and legislative subversion. The theoretical motivation for 
the use of size concentration as a proxy for institutional subversion was given by Grossman and 
Hellpman (1994), Friebel and Guriev (2002), Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2003), and Sonin 
(2003b). 
                                                 
4 For instance, we cannot compare directly the effects of opening a special economic zone on the territory on a particular 
firm and giving a large piece of land for free to another firm. 
5 An example of legislative preferential treatment that we cannot systematically account for can be drawn from Briansk 
regional legislature. In 1997 regional Duma adopted the law “On regulation of alcohol market” that stated that the alcohol is 
to be sold only by accredited firms. Any firm could get accreditation from the regional administration if it satisfies a list of 
criteria (for instance, being present on the market for several years, having storage place of a certain size, etc.) Products sold 
by firms without accreditation were subject to confiscation. There have been many firms on the market in the region at a 
time, but only one satisfied the criteria outlined in the law. 
6 This measure is available for 39 regions in 2001. All Transparency International and INDEM data can be found at 
http://www.anti-corr.ru/rating_regions/index.htm. 
7 This index is available for 72 regions in 1999 and 2000. It can be found at www.freepress.ru. 
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We deliberately talk about institutional subversion rather than state capture because we cannot 
differentiate between capture of regional legislation by private businesses and capture of private 
businesses by regional politicians (e.g., when politicians give favors to firms that are under their own 
control). We regard both of these cases as examples of institutional subversion (since both lead to 
unequal treatment of firms by regional institutions) but with a different distribution of bargaining 
power in the bargain between politicians and firms.8  
We find that, at the regional level, institutional subversion has an adverse effect on small 
business growth, tax collection, federal tax arrears, and regional public spending on some social 
services. At the micro-level, it generates substantial performance gains to firms that exercise political 
influence on regional authorities both in the long and the short run. In the long run, captor firms lack 
efficiency incentives, but continue extensive growth: profitability and market shares of captor-firms 
grow faster and labor productivity slower compared to their non-captor counterparts. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the measures of institutional 
subversion. Hypotheses are formulated in section 3. Section 4 presents data sources and summary 
statistics. Section 5 contains empirical methodology. Section 6 presents results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Measuring institutional subversion 
 Since the measurement of institutional subversion plays the central role in the whole exercise, 
we start with its description.  
Legislative subversion 
In order to construct a proxy for institutional subversion at the regional level and identify 
captor-enterprises in each region, we took the following steps. First, we limited ourselves to the largest 
firms in the regions: we constructed a list of firms that included five largest non-state regional firms 
and all state regional firms that are among the five largest (in terms of sales) in at least one year during 
1992 – 2000. The resulting list contained 978 firms (up to 20 largest regional firms in each of 73 
regions). We considered these firms as potentially able to exercise political influence. Second, we 
searched the comprehensive data base of Russia’s regional laws for any preferential treatment for each 
of these enterprises in the regional legislation in each year between 1992 and 2000. We deemed an 
enterprise to be treated preferentially in a particular year if it received any of the following benefits: tax 
breaks, investment credits, subsidies, subsidized loans and loans with the regional budget guarantee, 
official delays in tax payments, subsidized licensing, state property give away for free, or creation of 
                                                 
8 Numerous stories in the Russian media suggest that both cases are relevant for Russian regions but the case of state 
capture is more common. 
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the “Special Open Economic Zone” on the territory of that particular enterprise. We then counted the 
number of regional laws that grant distinct preferential treatments to each firm each year.9 To check the 
quality of our preferential treatments data, we correlate it with budgetary subsidies reported in firms’ 
balance sheets and found strong significant correlation despite the fact that direct subsidies were not the 
most common type of preferential treatments.10 Third, we constructed a measure of regional capture. 
We took concentration of preferential treatments for five non-state enterprises in each region each year 
that received the largest number of preferential treatments.11 Henceforth, we refer to this variable as 
“preferential treatment concentration.” Thus, at the regional level, holding total number of preferential 
treatments constant, higher preferential treatment concentration is an indication of higher extent of 
legislative subversion, since few firms receive disproportionate amount of preferential treatments by 
the regional legislature. At the firm-level, we take the share of regional preferential treatments that go 
to a particular firm in the total number of preferential treatment for five largest recipients as a proxy for 
the size of the firm’s political influence. 
Potential capture 
Preferential treatments concentration is an indication of mere one aspect of institutional 
subversion. Institutional environment affected by vested interests is much richer than just the regional 
legislation. In particular, political influence of vested interests extends over law enforcement (i.e., court 
decisions) and regulation (i.e., licensing policies). Thus, to check robustness of our results, we take 
regional size concentration among ten largest non-state regional firms as an indirect measure of 
potential subversion.12 As size proxies we take firm’s employment and output. There are two 
theoretical stories behind the potential subversion measure. First, in the model by Grossman and 
Helpman (1994), agents are assumed to have different interests; and big ones can organize their 
interests more easily. Concentration matters for potential for subversion because it makes organization 
cheaper. Second, Friebel and Guriev (2002) assumed all agents (local firms) to have similar interests 
(of attaching high-skilled worker to locality), thus, everyone benefits if attachment occurs. In this case, 
                                                 
9 Preferential treatments are persistent: If a firm receives preferential treatments in any particular year, there is an over 60% 
chance that it also receives preferential treatments in the subsequent or the previous year. If the firm does not get 
preferential treatments in any particular year, there is an over 80% chance that this enterprise does not get preferential 
treatments in both the subsequent and the previous year. 56% of firms in our sample do not receive any preferential 
treatments throughout the whole period. 
10 The largest share of preferential treatments (39% of the total number) are the tax breaks; the second most common are the 
subsidized loans from the budget (20%); and the next largest group is the direct subsidies (7%). 
11 As a measure of concentration, we take the Herfindahl-Hirsman measure (a sum of squared shares of the numbers of 
preferential treatments). 
12 We include the same number of the largest regional firms into the size concentration measure in order to have 
comparability across regions. Not including the smaller firms into the formula does not create a problem because only the 
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the free-rider externality is smaller for larger firms, because they receive a significantly larger portion 
of the total benefits when favorable regulations are adopted. Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2003) 
argued that there is a feedback in the relationship between concentration and institutional subversion: 
inequality leads to subversion and weak institutions allow only the rich to protect themselves and 
become even richer. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
The literature motivates us to formulate the following hypotheses. 
 
3.1. Regional level hypotheses 
Small business growth 
On the one hand, large powerful firms may be interested in SME growth because they may have 
excessive employment and would like to lay off workers, but they cannot do so for political reasons 
unless there are small firms to hire these workers.13 In this case, politically powerful firms may lobby 
for creating a favorable regulatory environment for small business. On the other hand, SME growth 
may be against interests of managers of large politically connected firms if they compete with the small 
firms for scarce skilled labor on the labor market (Friebel and Guriev, 2002) or for scarce government 
budgetary resources (Gehlbach, 2003). In this case, vested interests may put pressure on regional 
authorities to harden regulatory environment for small business. Regional authorities can directly affect 
small business environment, for example, by changing costs of registration, certification, inspections, 
licensing, and leasing premises. Thus, if either of the arguments set forth by Friebel and Guriev (2002) 
and Gehlbach (2003) are empirically relevant, we would observe smaller SME growth in the regions 
with higher level of institutional subversion, as in these regions more SMEs would be driven out of the 
market or to the unofficial sector.14 
GDP growth and investment 
 Theoretical predictions about the effect of institutional subversion on GDP growth and 
investment are ambiguous. On the one hand, state capture improves growth prospects and return on 
investment in captor firms since they obtain investment credits, tax breaks, and protection from 
competitors. On the other hand, subversion of institutions by vested interests should necessarily lead to 
                                                                                                                                                                       
largest firms can effectively capture the state. The results are robust to changes in the number of firms included in the 
concentration measure. 
13 Needless to say, managers of large firms may be interested in SME growth because they want to eat in good restaurants 
and shop in nice stores. 
14 See, for instance, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1998) and Frye and Zhuravskaya (2000). 
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lower growth and investment in discriminated firms with no political influence. Thus, politically 
influential firms are the only potential source of growth in environment with subverted institutions. 
Moreover, institutional subversion may lead to deterioration of growth even in politically connected 
firms in the long run because these firms lack incentives to improve efficiency because of relatively 
high returns from rent seeking activities. 
Tax collection and arrears 
 We expect tax collections to decrease with an increase in institutional subversion for a given 
level of tax base because vested interests use political influence to decrease their tax burden. This effect 
should be seen in aggregate because usually the large enterprises who contribute the most to regional 
budgets also have the political connections. The same logic implies that tax arrears are higher in more 
subverted regions because influential firms lobby for less strict tax enforcement. Moreover, federal 
arrears should increase to a larger extent than regional arrears since regional authorities, often, offer 
protection to captor firms from paying federal taxes.15 
Social spending 
 This hypothesis is motivated by Friebel and Guriev (2002) who argue that large enterprises in 
Russia are trying to attach skilled workers by paying them in-kind (for instance, providing them with 
corporate housing, healthcare, education, and daycare). This is done in order to prevent savings 
sufficient for the workers to leave. One implicit assumption of their model is that workers value 
privately provided social services because of poor public provision. Public access to high quality social 
services would undermine larger firms’ attachment strategies. We expect public spending on provision 
of housing, healthcare, daycare centers, etc. to be lower in regions with higher institutional subversion. 
There are two alternative explanations of possible negative relationship between social 
spending and institutional subversion, however. First, vested interests may not be concerned with social 
services at all; instead, they are more interested in other budgetary items (for instance, expenditures on 
industry, police, and media). Therefore, they may lobby for substitution of expenditures on social 
infrastructure services by spending on these budgetary items. Second, large enterprises and regional 
governments may agree to private provision of social services in exchange for tax breaks in order to 
avoid paying federal tax obligations.16 Both of these stories are consistent with institutional subversion. 
We test whether regional variation in any of the budgetary items can be partly explained by differences 
in the level of regional institutional subversion. 
                                                 
15 Mechanisms of the regional protection from paying federal taxes have been extensively studied in the literature. See, for 
instance, Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2001), Shleifer and Treisman (2000), Treisman (1999), Lambert et al. (2000), and 




3.2. Firm-level hypotheses 
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) pointed out that in countries with active market for 
capture (of which Russia is an example) politically connected firms enjoyed better performance in 
terms of growth in sales, employment, and investment in the short run. They also showed that captors 
in the BEEPS survey did not expect to outperform other firms in the long run. We test if our data are 
consistent with these findings. In addition to performance indicators used in the BEEPS study we 
compare profitability and labor productivity of captor and non-captor firms. Politically influential firms 
should also have higher growth of their market power because of their preferential treatment. 
 Worker-attachment story by Friebel and Guriev (2002) predicts higher bargaining power of 
politically influential firms vis-à-vis their employees. Thus, wage arrears in these firms should be 
higher. Political power of captor-firms may also allow them to run higher arrears to suppliers compared 
to other enterprises because of possible subversion of contract enforcement institutions. In addition, we 
expect tax arrears to be higher in politically connected firms, as was discussed in the previous sub-
section. 
 
3.3. Endogeneity problem – “social support hypothesis” 
There is an alternative story that could explain a strong correlation between our primary 
measure of institutional subversion (based on legislative preferential treatments) and the firm 
performance. This alternative story reflects endogeneity of preferential treatments to firm performance. 
Suppose that there is a large dying firm in a region. The regional government and legislators have 
political incentives to support this firm because its poor performance and potential closure threatens 
regional political stability: it would result in high social costs in terms of rises in unemployment and 
poverty. In order to avoid social unrest, regional politicians may grant preferential treatments to the 
firm, which, in turn, may result in performance improvements in the firm. To avoid endogeneity we 
need to instrument the share of preferential treatments. We use initial relative size of firms as an 
instrument. Unlike preferential treatments, initial size of firms is not associated with contemporaneous 
performance but is closely related to the likelihood of getting preferential treatment. This endogeneity 
problem should be important only on the micro-level because, on the macro-level, social support of 
troubled regions by their paternalistic governments should result in the increase in the number of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
16 See Lavrov, Litwack, and Sutherland (2001) for a description of the mechanism of federal tax evasion. 
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preferential treatments and not in their concentration for a given total number of regional preferential 
treatments. Thus, we need to carefully control for overall level of regional paternalism. 
 
4. Data and summary statistics 
Data sources 
 We use panel data from the following sources: 
1) Financial and other statistical data on enterprises comes from RERLD 2001, Russian Enterprise 
Registry Longitudinal Data set covering most basic financial statistics on (45,000) large and 
medium size firms in Russia that produce over 85% of Russia’s official industrial output. The 
data spans time period form 1992 to 2000 for 77 regions.17 
2) Comprehensive database of Russian regional laws “Consultant Plus” was used to construct a 
panel data set on legislative capture (www.consultant.ru/Software/Systems/RegLaw). 
Legislative data covers 978 largest regional enterprises in the period between 1992 and 2000 in 
73 regions of Russian Federation. 
3) Detailed regional budgetary figures for 1996 - 2000 come from the Ministry of Finance of the 
RF (www.minfin.ru). 
4) Other regional level statistical data come from “Goskomstat”, the official Russia’s statistical 
agency. The panel spans 1996 - 2000. 
 
Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the measures of capture. The mean value of preferential 
treatment concentration (0.395) corresponds to the most common situation when in a particular year 
one regional enterprise receives two preferential treatments, another two enterprises receive one 
preferential treatment each, and all other regional firms do not receive preferential treatments. The 
mean value of output concentration is 0.226. On average, the first firm’s output is twice as large as the 
output of the second largest firm and three times as large as the output of the third largest firm. The 
mean value of employment concentration is 0.160. On average, employment in the largest enterprise is 
70% larger than in the second largest; the second largest is 35% larger than the third; the third – 20% 
larger than the fourth, etc. As table 1A shows, measures of legislative and potential capture are 
positively, significantly, but not very highly correlated. Despite the low correlation between the 
legislative and potential capture, the results using the two alternative measures turned out to be similar. 
                                                 
17 For the detailed description of the data base, see Brown and Earl, 2000. 
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Figure 1A in appendix presents the map of regional preferential treatment concentration. Figure 2A 
shows the dynamic aspect of measures of institutional subversion throughout the 1990s.  
 
5. Empirical methodology 
 
5.1. Regional–level regressions 
First, we study macroeconomic effects of institutional subversion using regional level panel 
regressions. In the short run analysis, we estimate regional-level fixed effects regression (1). 
itititititit YEARCONTROLSNPTPTCY εραααα +++++= 4321      (1) 
Notation in equations (1) is as follows: Subscript i - region; t - year; Y - characteristics of 
macroeconomic conditions of the regional economies; PTC - preferential treatment concentration (our 
proxy for the regional institutional subversion); NPT - number of preferential treatments in five 
regional enterprises with maximum number of preferential treatments (our proxy for regional 
paternalism); CONTROLS – control variables (vary with dependent variables); YEAR - year dummies; 
ρ  - regional fixed effects. Greek letters denote estimation parameters. Equation (1) is the only 
equation for which we can use potential capture measure as a robustness check because in the rest of 
the analysis the interpretation of the results with potential capture measure suffers from alternative 
explanations that we can not rule out. For each of the hypotheses tested using equation (1) and 
described in section 3.1, table 2 presents all the variables used as dependent and control variables. 
For the long run analysis, we estimate regional-level between effects regression (2): 
iiiiii CONTROLSYNPTPTCY εααα ++++= 0321        (2) 
The notation in equation (2) is the same as in equation (1) with the following additions: Upper bars 
denote average values of the respective variables across all years (excluding the initial year); 0Y  
denotes the level of the dependent variable in the initial year. Specification (2) is an OLS cross-section 
regression of mean values of variables across time controlling for their initial levels. 
 The list of dependent and control variables for equation (2) is the same as for equation (1), 
except that in the long run we test only the hypotheses that are related to small business development 
and GRP growth and investment (since budgetary spending and revenues are inherently a short run 
phenomenon and the long run theoretical predictions are unclear). 
 
5.2. Firm-level regressions 
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In order to investigate microeconomic effects of institutional subversion on captor firms, we use 
the sample of firms for which we have legislative data. The short run analysis uses fixed effects panel 
regression specification given in equation (3): 
ftffttftftftftftft sizeYEARindtrREGTRNPTRPTCsharepty εφααααααα ++++++++= 7654321 _  (3) 
For the long run, we use between effects regression equation (4): 
ffffffffff sizestateREGindyNPTRPTCsharepty εαααααααα ++++++++= 876504321 _  (4) 
In equations (3) and (4), the following new notation is added: Subscript f stands for firm. Lower case 
letters denote firm-level and industry-level variables. Upper case denotes regional-level variables. y  
stands for various indicators of firms’ performance: log values of sales, employment, fixed assets, 
regional (2-digit OKONH) and national (3-digit OKONH) market shares, labor productivity, profit, 
arrears to suppliers, wage arrears, arrears to budget. sharept _  is a firm’s share of preferential 
treatments (instrumented by lagged relative size of the firm).18 RPTC is the residual preferential 
treatment concentration filtered through the total regional number of preferential treatments given to 
their five largest recipients. NPT is the regional number of preferential treatments (as before). In the 
micro-level regressions, PTC and NPT are very highly correlated, thus, we orthogonalize them before 
including in the regression.19 Thus, RPTC controls for the regional-level capture and NPT controls for 
the regional paternalism. REGTR is the regional trend of the dependent variable (calculated as regional 
aggregate). indtr  is the industry trend of the dependent variable (calculated as industry aggregate). 
Regressions of market shares we do not include regional and industry trends as controls. size stands for 
log sales; it is used as a control variable in regressions of wage, trade, and tax arrears and profits. φ  
denotes firm fixed effects. ind is an industry dummy; REG - a regional dummy; state - a state- 
enterprise dummy.  
In short run fixed effects regressions (3), we limit the sample to observations in regions and 
years for which total number of regional preferential treatments is greater than zero. This is because 
only in this case our instrument is highly correlated with the share of preferential treatments. In case 
when the regional number of preferential treatments is zero, the value of the share of preferential 
treatments variable is constant across firms while employment shares differ greatly. In between effects 
                                                 
18 In fixed effects panel regressions (short run), the share of firm’s preferential treatments is instrumented with lagged 
employment share. In between effects regressions (long run), the initial employment share is used as an instrument for all 
dependent variables except employment. In employment regressions, initial output share is an instrument. This choice of the 
instruments is driven by their quality. 
19 An alternative approach is to include just plain PTC (without NPT). It leads to the same results. 
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6.1. Regional-level effects of institutional subversion 
 Let us turn to presentation of the results about the aggregate regional effect of institutional 
subversion. 
Small business 
Table 3 presents the results of the tests of the hypothesis about small business growth: panel A 
of the table reports short run panel-data results and panel B long run cross-section results. In the short 
run, preferential treatments concentration has significant negative effect only on the share of small 
business employment. Coefficients of the other two measures of small business development (the 
number of small businesses and retail turnover per capita) are also negative, but insignificant.21 The 
magnitude of the short term relationship between capture and small business is as follows: One 
standard deviation increase in the preferential treatment concentration decreases the share of small 
business employment by 2.4% in the same year. One standard deviation increase in preferential 
treatment concentration implies, for instance, that among the five largest recipients of preferential 
treatments in one year, the distribution of the number of preferential treatments changes from {three; 
two; one; zero; zero} to {four, two, zero; zero; zero}. The long run relationship between the legislative 
capture and small business growth is stronger. Just as in the short-run regressions, coefficients of all 
three measures of small business development are negative. In the long run, two of the three measures 
(the number of small businesses and the share of small business employment) are significantly related 
to institutional subversion. One standard deviation increase in the average preferential treatment 
concentration decreases the number of small businesses per capita by 13% and share of small business 
employment by 7%. One standard deviation increase in average regional preferential treatments 
concentration from the mean (holding the total number of preferential treatments constant) implies that, 
in seven out of nine years, the number of preferential treatments in each of the five largest recipients of 
                                                 
20 The results of long run estimation are robust to limiting the sample to be equal to the sub-sample for which fixed effects 
regressions are valid. 
21 The total number of preferential treatments given to the five largest recipients of legislative preferential treatments has 
significant negative effect on the share of small business employment. There is, however, an ambiguity in interpretation of 
this coefficient. On the one hand, the number of preferential treatments, for a given level of concentration, measures the 
strength of influence (when only few firms receive any preferential treatments); on the other hand, the number of 
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preferential treatments remains unchanged: the largest recipient gets two preferential treatments, 
another two enterprises receive one each and no other firm receives preferential treatments; but in each 
of the other two years, one firm only receives four preferential treatments. The fact that retail turnover 
is not significantly affected by institutional subversion points to the possibility that some small 
businesses do not exit the market completely under the regulatory pressure from the regional 
governments, instead, they are driven to the unofficial sector. Overall, our hypothesis that vested 
interests get in the way of small business growth finds support in the data. The use of size 
concentration as a measure of potential capture confirms robustness of this result.22 
GDP growth and investment 
As discussed in the hypotheses section, the theoretical prediction about effect of state capture 
on growth and investment is ambiguous. Vested interest groups that primarily engage in rent seeking 
may grow fast due to favorable business conditions. This growth may outweigh efficiency losses from 
rent seeking activities in the short run. Panel A of table 4 shows that annual changes in GRP per capita 
are significantly positively associated with changes in preferential treatment concentration. Thus, in the 
short run, positive effect of institutional subversion on growth within vested interests groups dominates 
the negative effect on the rest of the producers. The economic significance of this result is as follows: 
one standard deviation increase in preferential treatment concentration increases regional product per 
capita by one percent in the same year. We do not find significant relationship between legislative 
subversion and investment. Panel B of table 4 presents the long run results: We find no statistically 
significant effect of legislative subversion on growth or investment. The fact that short run positive 
effect on growth disappears in the long run is consistent with the view that rent-seeking activities of 
captor enterprises destroy value in the long run, and that we just have insufficient horizon to observe 
negative correlation (reliable GRP data are available only for six years 1995-2000 of which the first 
year we take as a baseline). Robustness check yields strong positive relationship between size 
concentration and growth and investment.23 
Tax collection and arrears 
                                                                                                                                                                       
preferential treatments may just measure the extent of paternalism of regional governments towards all firms (when many 
firms get preferential treatments). These effects have the opposite predicted signs. 
22 We find strong negative relationship between changes in regional size concentration, on the one hand, and the share of 
small business employment and the number of small businesses, on the other, as reported in table 2A. One standard 
deviation increase in the output concentration among ten largest firms decreases the number of small businesses per capita 
by 14% and the share of small business employment by 23%. 
23 Table 2A presents the results: Employment concentration among ten largest private firms strongly positively affects 
contemporaneous private and total investment and has no significant effect on GRP. Changes in output concentration have 
positive significant effect on GRP growth and no effect on investment. One standard deviation increase in output 
concentration is associated with 2.8% additional GRP growth. A standard deviation increase in employment concentration 
leads to a 9% increase in aggregate regional investment. 
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Table 5 presents results of the tax-collection hypothesis test. The data are consistent with the 
hypothesis. There is a strong negative statistically significant and robust association between regional 
tax collection and institutional subversion, holding other things constant. One standard deviation 
increase in preferential treatment concentration decreases regional total net revenues and tax revenues 
by 1.2%, federal and total tax arrears by 2.7%.24 Institutional subversion does not seem to affect 
regional arrears to the same extent as federal arrears. This evidence supports the view expressed, for 
instance, by Sonin (2003b) and Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2001) that Russia’s regional 
governments protect regional firms from paying federal taxes. 
Fiscal policies 
Table 6 presents the results of the test of the relationship between institutional subversion and 
the size of the social budgetary expenditures. Our findings are consistent with Friebel and Guriev’s 
story as well as the story of federal tax evasion (Lavrov et al., 2001): holding other things constant, 
legislative subversion is negatively significantly correlated with expenditures on construction of some 
social service facilities. One standard deviation increase in preferential treatment concentration 
decreases expenditure on construction of new housing by 5%, and cultural facilities by 14%.25 
Expenditures on construction of education and healthcare facilities also have negative, but insignificant 
coefficients. There is no evidence of significant correlation in any other budgetary items with our 
measures of institutional subversion. 
 
6.2. Firm-level effects of institutional subversion 
The evidence of microeconomic effects of institutional subversion is consistent with our 
hypotheses. Firm-level fixed-effects regressions presented in table 7 show that, holding other things 
constant, in the short run captors experience significantly higher investment, employment and sales 
growth, and growth of their shares both on the regional and national markets. The magnitude of the 
short run effect is as follows: A one percent increase in the share of preferential treatments (from the 
mean value equal to 0.15) in any particular year increases the enterprise employment and sales by 
approximately 2% and fixed assets by 1.5 %. In addition, regional market share increases by one tenth 
of a percentage point and national market share by one hundredth of a percentage point. The long run 
                                                 
24 Table 2A shows the results of the robustness check: one standard deviation increase in output concentration decreases 
taxes by 6.1%; in employment concentration - by 2.7%, in addition, one standard deviation increase in employment 
concentration increases federal tax arrears by 6%. 
25 Robustness check shows that there is no association between construction expenditure and size concentration. At the same 
time, one standard deviation increase in output concentration decreases (net of wage bill) total expenditures on education by 
5.2%, healthcare by 3.5%, housing by 4.4% (see Table 2A). In addition, the results are robust to the choice of specification 
between having shares and levels of expenditures as dependent variables. 
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results are stronger (table 8). We find that, holding other things constant, captors continue to 
outperform non-captor firms in terms of sales and employment growth, investment in fixed assets, 
national and regional market shares. In addition, in the long run, captors have higher profits and higher 
bargaining power vis-à-vis employees, suppliers, and government that allows them to run higher wage, 
trade, and tax arrears. An important finding is that in the long run, firms that engage in institutional 
subversion have significantly lower labor productivity growth compared to their counterparts despite 
their higher profitability. Thus, long run gains to captor firms are a result of rent-seeking activities and 
not driven by efficiency improvements. The economic significance of the results in the long run is as 
follows: A one percent increase in the average share of preferential treatments in eight years (from the 
mean equal to 0.1) increases average sales by approximately 1.7%, average employment by 0.5%, 
average fixed assets by 3.6%, profitability by 1.4%, arrears to suppliers by 1.4%, wage arrears by 2%, 
and tax arrears by 3%, but decreases labor productivity by one percent. It also leads to one tenth of a 
percentage point increase in the regional market share and two hundredth of a percentage point increase 
in the national market share. 
 
6.3. Comparison with BEEPS  
Our findings by and large are consistent with BEEPS evidence (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 
2000 and Hellman and Schankerman, 2000). Cross-country comparisons based on BEEPS show that in 
countries with higher level of capture, firms from the BEEPS sample have on average lower 
investment, output and employment growth. We show that there is a short run positive association 
between GRP growth and capture in Russian regions and that it disappears in the long run. How one 
can reconcile these pieces of evidence? Since variation in institutional subversion across countries is 
much higher than across Russia’s regions, the evidence from BEEPS and our study are perfectly 
consistent because the relationship between the level of institutional subversion and growth may be 
different within the group of high-capture environments (i.e., countries or regions) and between the 
high and low capture environments. We find robust negative association between the level of regional 
institutional subversion and small business development. This finding is in line with Hellman and 
Schankerman’s (2000) result that reform is slower in the high-capture countries.  
There is a slight dichotomy between BEEPS and our findings at the micro-level: there is 
universal evidence that sales and investment grow faster in captor firms compared to non-captors in the 
short run. Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) found that captor firms do not expect these gains to be 
sustained in the long run. We find, however, that captors are too modest in their expectations: actual 
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long run growth in sales, investment and market share is higher in captor firms but their productivity 




This paper investigates the effects of institutional subversion on small business, economic 
growth, fiscal policies and firm performance in the Russian regions. The key findings can be 
summarized as follows: 
The most important effect of institutional subversion that we have documented is that 
environments with higher level of state capture have greater obstacles to small business growth. This 
effect has particularly significant consequences in a transition economy because institutional 
subversion becomes an impediment to asset re-allocation from the old to the new sector. Despite the 
negative effect of institutional subversion on small business, institutional advantages for captor firms 
result in short-term aggregate economic growth which is not sustained in the long run. Tax capacity of 
the state deteriorates with capture: tax revenues fall and arrears grow for a given level of GRP. In 
addition, a part of fiscal expenditures are affected by the level of institutional subversion: construction 
of new social facilities is smaller in high-capture regions. 
On the micro level, capturing the state brings great advantages to firms. Captors exhibit faster 
growth in employment, sales, market share, and investment both in the short and the long run. In 
addition, higher bargaining power gives captors the ability to maintain higher arrears to suppliers and 
employees in the long run since local officials protect captors from legal enforcement of these 
payments. The source of the long run captors’ growth is rent-seeking as they win market share from 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of state capture measures 
1992-2000: Obs Mean SD Min Median Max 
Regions       
Preferential treatment concentration 667 0.395 0.294 0.200 0.200 1 
Total number of preferential treatments in the region 667 1.41 1.99 0 0 11 
Output concentration among ten largest private firms 644 0.226 0.145 0.103 0.176 1 
Employment concentration among ten largest private firms 653 0.160 0.082 0.101 0.131 0.760 
Enterprises       




Table 2: Specification of regional–level regressions. 
Hypotheses: Measures, used as dependent variables, Y: Control variables, CONTROLS: 
Small business growth - Log number of small businesses per capita 
- Log share of small business employment 
- Log retail turnover per capita 
- Log population size (instrumented by lagged values) 
- Log average wage level (instrumented by lagged values) 
GRP growth and 
investment 
- Log GRP per capita 
- Log investment per capita 
- Log private investment per capita 
 
- Log population size (instrumented by lagged values) 
- Log average wage level (instrumented by lagged values) 
- Log investment per capita (instrumented by lagged values; used 
only in regressions with GRP per capita as dependent variable) 
- Life expectancy 
- Log share of secondary school students in regional population 
- Share of oil and gas extraction industries 
Tax collections and 
arrears 
- Log tax revenues per capita 
- Log total revenues net of transfers per capita 
- Log level of regional tax arrears per capita 
- Log level of federal tax arrears per capita 
- Log level of total tax arrears per capita 
- Log GRP per capita (instrumented by lagged values) 
- Log population size (instrumented by lagged values) 
- Dummy for regional election year 
Social spending Log of per capita regional budget 
expenditures on: 
- Culture (net of wages) 
- Education (net of wages) 
- Healthcare (net of wages) 
- Housing (net of wages) 
Log of per capita expenditures on 
construction of: 
- New housing 
- Cultural facilities 
- Education facilities 
- Healthcare facilities 
- Log population size (instrumented by lagged values) 
- Log total budgetary expenditures 
- Dummy for regional election year 
Note: We use retail turnover as an indirect proxy for small business development because reporting on retail turnover is often much better than on small 
business employment: many small firms underreport employment for tax purposes. In the panel regressions, instruments are one-year lags; in the between 
regressions, instruments are the initial values of respective variables. In growth regressions, we use control variables standard for growth literature. (See, for 
instance, Barro, 1997, Barro and Sala- i -Martin, 1995, Mauro, 1996, Sala- i -Martin, 1997). Dummy for regional election year is added to control for 






Table 3: Small business growth 
 
Note: Absolute value of Z-statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 Panel A. Short run. Panel B. Long run. 

















-0.023 -0.084 -0.009 -0.446 -0.231 -0.156 Preferential treatment 
concentration  [0.65] [1.88]* [0.42] [1.99]** [1.74]* [0.76] 
-0.008 -0.029 0.002 0.019 -0.010 -0.001 Preferential treatments 
[1.30] [3.83]*** [0.47] [0.83] [0.76] [0.04] 
Log population (instrum-d) 0.379 1.348 0.782 -0.001 0.030 0.168 
 [1.08] [1.93]* [7.47]*** [0.03] [1.04] [4.93]*** 
Log wage (instrum-d) -0.608 3.142 1.332 0.252 -0.082 0.229 
 [0.67] [2.00]** [3.87]*** [3.19]*** [1.33] [2.41]** 
   0.594 0.797 0.525 Initial level of dependent 
variable    [8.58]*** [14.14]*** [5.55]*** 
Constant 3.371 -27.957 -6.555 -3.661 1.151 1.110 
 [0.53] [2.15]** [2.50]** [5.21]*** [2.72]*** [1.71]* 
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes    
Regional fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes    
Observations 415 278 558 432 286 568 
Number of regions 70 71 72 73 73 73 
R-squared 0.001 0.01 0.21 0.49 0.61 0.53 
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Table 4: GRP growth and investment 
 Panel A. Short run. Panel B. Long run. 
















-0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.22 0.22 0.04 Preferential treatment 
concentration [0.68] [0.37] [1.71]* [0.92] [1.04] [0.41] 
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 Preferential treatments 
[1.98]** [1.20] [1.06] [0.63] [1.34] [0.63] 
  0.14    0.33 Log investment per capita 
(instrum-d)   [2.26]**    [5.38]*** 
Log wage (instrum-d) 1.05 1.23 0.74 0.12 0.32 0.06 
 [5.97]*** [1.95]* [5.38]*** [0.47] [1.37] [0.49] 
Log population (instrum-d) -1.04 -0.23 -0.92 0.21 0.04 0.05 
 [1.87]* [0.13] [2.81]*** [3.91]*** [0.78] [2.82]*** 
Life expectancy 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.004 -0.01 
 [0.82] [1.33] [3.06]*** [0.77] [0.15] [0.62] 
1.98 2.67 0.47 0.04 -0.77 0.19 % secondary school students 
 [2.85]*** [1.95]* [1.38] [0.14] [2.73]*** [1.37] 
0.81 1.14 0.39 0.22 0.57 -0.12 % of oil/gas extraction industries 
[5.07]*** [3.55]*** [3.71]*** [0.92] [2.78]*** [1.20] 
Constant -2.45 -14.75 -0.53 1.28 2.93 -3.08 
 [0.50] [1.09] [0.19] [0.49] [1.21] [2.88]*** 
   0.64 0.71 0.63 Initial level of dependent variable
   [3.95]*** [4.18]*** [7.65]*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes    
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes    
Observations 554 344 480 556 346 480 
Number of regions 72 72 70 72 72 70 
R-squared 0.06 0.26 0.04 0.47 0.62 0.88 
Note: All dependent variables are in logs. Absolute value of Z-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Regional tax collections and arrears to regional and federal budgets 
 Panel A. Revenues. Panel B. Arrears. 
  Tax revenues per 
capita 
Total net revenues 
per capita 
Regional tax 
arrears per capita 
Federal tax arrears 
per capita 
Total tax arrears 
per capita 
-0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.09 0.09 Preferential treatment 
concentration [1.80]* [1.66]* [1.42] [1.71]* [2.14]** 
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 Preferential treatments 
[1.23] [2.48]** [0.62] [1.13] [1.57] 
1.30 1.22 0.53 0.81 0.49 Log GRP per capita 
(instrum-d) [6.39]*** [5.77]*** [2.07]** [2.91]*** [1.98]** 
1.95 3.17 2.19 5.84 4.49 Log population (instrum-d) 
[2.27]** [3.50]*** [1.93]* [4.28]*** [4.07]*** 
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 Regional election year 
 [0.39] [1.03] [1.01] [1.40] [1.17] 
Constant -10.20 -18.78 -12.28 -39.58 -28.28 
 [1.58] [2.77]*** [1.44] [3.87]*** [3.41]*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 355 351 420 421 424 
Number of regions 71 71 71 71 71 
R-squared 0.30 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.4 





Table 6: Budget expenditures 
  Variable part of expenditure items per capita Expenditures on construction per capita 







-0.036 -0.014 0.019 -0.009 -0.178 -0.484 -0.250 -0.210 Preferential treatment 
concentration  [1.04] [0.77] [0.76] [0.32] [1.84]* [1.91]* [1.52] [1.53] 
0.020 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.019 0.013 0.042 0.017 Preferential treatments 
[3.47]*** [3.26]*** [0.50] [0.21] [1.19] [0.31] [1.51] [0.75] 
0.537 0.538 1.845 0.738 6.232 9.280 -10.554 8.737 Log population 
(instrum-d) [0.46] [0.85] [2.07]** [0.74] [1.82]* [0.90] [1.79]* [1.76]* 
0.916 0.717 0.739 0.947 0.854 0.941 0.858 1.090 Log of total 
expenditures [11.80]*** [17.13]*** [12.86]*** [14.35]*** [3.92]*** [1.62] [2.24]** [3.43]*** 
-0.030 -0.012 0.010 -0.001 -0.026 -0.054 -0.106 0.107 Year of regional 
elections [1.33] [0.97] [0.64] [0.07] [0.41] [0.33] [0.97] [1.17] 
Constant -7.377 -3.782 -13.746 -6.538 -48.417 -75.657 73.151 -69.816 
 [0.86] [0.82] [2.11]** [0.90] [1.93]* [0.99] [1.69]* [1.92]* 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 360 360 359 360 353 319 350 355 
Number of regions 72 72 72 72 72 69 72 72 
R-squared 0.47 0.34 0.08 0.35 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.07 




Table 7: Microeconomic effects of capture in the short run 















Profitability Labor productivity 
13.85 12.38 10.33 1.18 0.46 -5.72 0.96 0.06 -3.91 -1.75 Firm’s share of 
preferential treatments 
(Instrum-d) 
[2.64]*** [2.11]** [2.55]** [0.45] [0.21] [1.29] [2.28]** [2.00]** [1.39] [1.18] 




[0.48] [0.51] [0.61] [0.21] [0.70] [1.59] [0.92] [0.75] [1.04] [0.44] 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.002 0.01 -0.04 -0.002 -0.00002 0.01 0.002 Regional paternalism 
(Total number of 
preferential 
treatments) 
[1.07] [1.29] [0.94] [0.11] [0.99] [1.54] [0.88] [0.10] [0.44] [0.25] 
   0.04 0.19 0.09   0.46  Log sales 
   [0.68] [4.51]*** [0.90]   [10.54]***  
-0.16 0.02 -0.27 0.04 -0.03 0.27   0.10 -0.02 Regional trend 
[0.37] [0.21] [1.35] [0.25] [0.29] [0.96]   [3.21]*** [0.58] 
0.40 -0.04 0.39 0.03 0.02 0.07   0.06 0.78 Industry trend 
[0.94] [0.25] [0.82] [0.34] [0.25] [0.58]   [1.61] [7.44]*** 
5.02 11.78 10.85 7.02 9.15 8.48 0.17 0.01 4.18 1.22 Constant 
[1.39] [5.37]*** [4.68]*** [10.00]*** [14.91]*** [6.46]*** [5.36]*** [2.79]*** [7.24]*** [2.36]** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects for firms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.27 
Observations 2925 2982 2824 1462 1449 1446 2958 2969 2757 2872 
Number of firms 792 800 781 648 648 648 806 799 760 793 
Note: All dependent variables are in logs. In all regressions share of preferential treatments is instrumented by the lagged employment 
share. In order for the instrument to work, observations are excluded from the sample when annual number of regional preferential 
treatments is zero. 
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Table 8: Microeconomic effects of capture in the long run  


















4.91 17.78 35.96 20.48 13.76 30.04 1.32 0.21 14.25 -10.03 Firm’s share of 
preferential treatments 
(Instrum-d) 
[2.01]** [2.69]*** [1.71]* [2.45]** [1.81]* [1.72]* [2.46]** [3.41]*** [1.84]* [3.40]*** 




[1.78]* [1.47] [1.89]* [2.06]** [1.66]* [1.65]* [2.39]** [3.29]*** [1.34] [2.72]*** 
0.08 0.41 0.70 -0.15 -0.14 0.06 0.06 0.004 0.32 -0.28 Regional paternalism 
(Total number of 
preferential treatments) 
[1.78]* [2.13]** [2.19]** [0.65] [0.89] [0.19] [4.02]*** [2.18]** [1.82]* [3.19]*** 
   0.13 0.22 -0.04   0.51  Log sales 
   [1.10] [2.23]** [0.18]   [5.72]***  
0.67 0.21 0.34 0.37 0.44 0.38 0.64 0.38 0.10 0.33 Initial level of depend 
variable [21.59]*** [3.00]*** [1.94]* [3.40]*** [4.43]*** [3.51]*** [16.50]*** [11.71]*** [2.27]** [8.64]*** 
-0.02 -0.35 -0.40 -1.57 -0.92 -2.35 -0.03 -0.01 -0.52 -0.04 
State enterprise dummy [0.25] [1.55] [0.71] [1.99]** [1.34] [1.60] [1.25] [1.96]** [1.36] [0.31] 
Constant 1.32 6.01 1.23 -0.50 1.40 -0.51 -0.15 -0.04 -0.59 4.94 
  [3.61]*** [5.70]*** [0.61] [0.26] [0.95] [0.16] [1.51] [2.96]*** [0.49] [7.53]*** 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.558 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.27 0.09 0.08 0.25 0.19 0.11 
Observations 5492 5657 5317 1131 1122 1123 5629 5637 2821 5426 
Number of firms 906 917 896 582 575 579 914 915 767 904 
Note: All dependent variables are in logs. In all regressions (except the employment regression) share of preferential treatments is 








Table 1A: Correlations among the measures of institutional subversion 
 Preferential treatment concentration 
 Pooled (633 obs.) Regional between effects  (72 obs.) 
Regional fixed effects 
(633 obs.) 
0.120 0.219 0.066 Output concentration among ten 
largest private firms [0.002] [0.065] [0.096] 
0.105 0.221 0.085 Employment concentration 
among ten largest private firms [0.008] [0.062] [0.033] 

































































































Control variables used in regressions 
Small business development 
Number of small businesses per capita -0.98*** -0.28 Log wage (instrum-d), Log population (instrum-d), Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Share of small business employment -1.58*** -0.88* Log wage (instrum-d), Log population (instrum-d), Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Retail turnover per capita -0.01 0.15 Log wage (instrum-d), Log population (instrum-d), Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
GRP growth, investment 
GRP per capita 0.19 ** 0.08 
Log wage (instrum-d), Log population (instrum-d), Life expectancy, % secondary school 
students, % of oil/gas extraction industries, Log investment per capita (instrum-d), Year 
dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Investment per capita 0.03 1.03*** Log wage (instrum-d), Log population (instrum-d), Life expectancy, % secondary school students, % of oil/gas extraction industries, Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Private investment per capita 0.32 1.15*** Log wage (instrum-d), Log population (instrum-d), Life expectancy, % secondary school students, % of oil/gas extraction industries, Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Tax collections and arrears 
Tax revenues per capita -0.42** -0.33* Log population (instrum-d), Log GRP per capita (instrum-d), Year of regional elections, Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Total revenues per capita -0.21 -0.22 Log population (instrum-d), Log GRP per capita (instrum-d), Year of regional elections, Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Regional tax arrears per capita 0.04 0.29 Log GRP per capita (instrum-d), Log population (instrum-d),  Regional election year, Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Federal tax arrears per capita -0.003 0.73* Log GRP per capita (instrum-d), Log population (instrum-d),  Regional election year, Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Total tax arrears per capita 0.03 0.65** Log GRP per capita (instrum-d), Log population (instrum-d),  Regional election year, Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Budget expenditures  (variable part of expenditure items per capita) 
Culture -0.2 -0.33 Log population (instrum-d), Log of total expenditures, Year of regional elections, Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Education -0.35*** -0.43*** Log population (instrum-d), Log of total expenditures, Year of regional elections, Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Healthcare -0.24* -0.29 Log population (instrum-d), Log of total expenditures, Year of regional elections, Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Housing -0.230** -0.04 Log population (instrum-d), Log of total expenditures, Year of regional elections, Year dummies, Regional fixed effects 
Note: All dependent variables are in logs. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
